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CASE COMMENT
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF DATA PRIVACY
LAW: HOW THE STORED COMMUNICATION ACT LAGS
BEHIND MODERN TECHNOLOGY
Andrew Bayudan*

I. OVERVIEW

The Stored Communications Act (SCA),
which allows the
government to compel the production of electronic customer information
from Internet Service Providers (ISPs), was found to be limited in scope
by the Second Circuit in Microsoft Corp. v. United States.2 The Second
Circuit ruled that the SCA did not permit the government to force ISPs to
hand over data that is located outside the United States. 3
In 2013, a warrant served under the SCA, was authorized requiring
Microsoft to produce information and emails related to a federal criminal
investigation. 4 Many of the emails demanded by the warrant were located
on a data server in Ireland.s Since these emails were outside the United
States, Microsoft argued that the warrant under the SCA had no
jurisdiction in Ireland and moved for the warrant to be quashed. 6 The
magistrate judge denied the motion. 7 The denial was also affirmed by the
Southern District of New York, reasoning that the SCA compelled those
served with warrants under the SCA to produce information regardless of
the information's location.8 Microsoft appealed the district court's
decision, 9 held that the district court's denial of microsoft's motion to
quash the warrant was improper and the case should be reversed and
remanded to the district court. 10
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II. BACKGROUND

A. Microsoft's Email Services
Microsoft is an ISP headquartered and incorporated in the United
States." Microsoft provides free online email services to the public. 12
When creating an email account, users are asked to indicate their location
of residence. 13 The information associated with a user's account, along
with the emails sent and received through the account, is stored on
physical servers that are housed in large datacenters. 14 The datacenters
are generally located near the location the user initially indicated when
creating the email account. 15 This email service is offered to customers
in over 100 countries and Microsoft maintains datacenters in over forty
countries. 16
Though Microsoft's datacenters are located worldwide, the company
is able to manage and collect information on servers in other countries
through its database management computer program from the United
States. 17 This computer program can be accessed in offices in the United
States. Additionally, this computer program allows Microsoft to retrieve
data located on servers in other countries and store it on servers in the
United States. 18 Therefore, Microsoft employees in the United States do
not need to travel outside the United States to collect information from
servers located in other countries. 19
B. The Stored CommunicationsAct
The U.S. Government served a warrant on Microsoft to produce
certain electronic information under the authority of the SCA. 20 In 1986,
the SCA was passed to protect American privacy interests in response to
the rapidly evolving and advancing technologies that developed
alongside the personal computer. 2 1 The SCA prohibits unauthorized
parties to access or modify electronic communications maintained by
ISPs. 22 Yet, the SCA also contains a provision that requires ISPs to
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provide data that the government so requests with a warrant, pursuant to
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 23 The SCA did not, however,
contain any provisions that address whether the issued warrants would be
applied to electronic communications outside the United States. 24
C. The SCA's ExtraterritorialScope
A two-part test adopted from Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd. to
determine whether the SCA can apply to extraterritorial electronic
communications is used to interpret the SCA. 25 The first part of the test
looks at whether the statute's language suggests extraterritorial
applications. 26 When interpreting a statute, there is a default presumption
that Congress enacted the statute with the intent to apply the statute only
within the United States. 27 This part of the test requires that the statutory
language has a clear indication that the statute would apply
extraterritorially. 2 8
For the second part of the test, it has to be determined whether the
application of the statute in the disputed case is an unlawful and
extraterritorial application. 29 In this part of the test, the facts surrounding
the case and the statute's focus are examined.3 0
D. The DistrictCourt's Reasoning
The district court, finding that the SCA warrant could be enforced
extraterritorially, focused on the ambiguity of the SCA's use of the word
"warrant". 31 The district court stated that a warrant, in the context of the
SCA, actually is a hybrid of a warrant and a subpoena. 32 The SCA warrant
is like a traditional search warrant because the SCA warrant must be
obtained by following the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 33 The
SCA warrant is like a subpoena because the receiver of the SCA warrant

23. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2012).
24. Microsoft, 829 F.3d at 208.
25. See generally Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank, Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010); Microsoft, 829
F.3d at 209.
26. Microsoft, 829 F.3d at 210.
27. Id.
28. Id.; see also Morrison, 561 U.S. at 247.
29. Microsoft, 829 F.3d at 210.
30. Id.
31. In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by
Microsoft Corp., 15 F. Supp. 3d 467, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
32. Id. at 471.
33. Id. at 470.
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must provide the requested information no matter the information's
location. 34

The district court also considered the practical effects of not
compelling Microsoft to produce the email data from extraterritorial
servers. 3 5 By not compelling Microsoft to do so, criminals could simply
avoid SCA warrants by moving their servers to other counties. 36 This
would also result in the government having to turn to Mutual Legal
Assistance Treaties (MLATs) to obtain information stored
extraterritorially. 37 MLATs are international agreements where one
country can request assistance from another country with criminal
investigations that have effects in other countries. 38 Since MLATs rely
on the cooperation of another country's government, MLATs often
operate very slowly. 39 Additionally, the United States does not have
MLATs with many countries, making it easier for criminals to avoid SCA
warrants. 40

III. THE INSTANT CASE

In the instant case, the Second Circuit applied the two-part Morrison
Test to determine whether or not the warrant under the SCA could be
applied to the email located on servers in Ireland. 4 1 Reversing the district
court's decision, the Second Circuit decided that the SCA warrant could
not compel Microsoft to produce data located on Ireland's servers. 42
For the first part of the Morrison test, the court found that Congress
did not expressly indicate their intent for the SCA to apply
extraterritorially. 43 There is no textual or documentary support to suggest
that the SCA applies extraterritorially and reading the SCA to have an
extraterritorial scope is arbitrarily expanding the SCA' s reach. 44
The court further explained that the district court's interpretation of
the word "warrant" was incorrect. 45 The court found that the district court
inappropriately interpreted "warrant" as having a hybrid meaning. 46
34.
35.
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Id. at 474-75.

36.

Id.

37.
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Instead, the court held that "warrant" under the SCA had a meaning only
related to the privacy protections granted by the Fourth Amendment. 4 7
Turning to the second part of the Morrison test, the court determined
that using an SCA warrant to compel Microsoft to produce electronic
information located on a server in Ireland was an extraterritorial
application of the SCA. 4 8 The SCA was primarily enacted to protect and
focus on citizens' privacy, as evidenced by the SCA being part of the
larger Electronic Communications Privacy Act. 49 Further, the SCA's
warrant to Microsoft was being used to assist a criminal investigation,
rather than protecting a citizen's privacy interest.5 0 The SCA warrant
issued to Microsoft targeted information on data servers located in
Ireland.5 1 Because the focus of the SCA warrant was a privacy interest
that existed in Ireland, this application of the SCA was extraterritorial and
outside the SCA's scope. 52

IV. ANALYSIS

This case was decided incorrectly because the court failed to consider
the technological advancements that have occurred since the initial
creation of the SCA. The SCA was passed in 1986, where the state of
technology was vastly different and inferior to the state of technology
today. Since 1986, both the amount of storable data and the easiness of
storing data have greatly increased, while the cost of storing data has
decreased. Additionally, developments in the internet have made it very
easy to transport and store data across large distances at extremely fast
speeds. When the SCA was initially passed, these advancements were
likely never considered or realized. Many of the technological obstacles
that existed in the 1980s that posed practical problems in extraterritorially
enforcing the SCA warrant no longer exist today.
Microsoft, like many other large corporations that maintain large
amounts of electronic data and have numerous customers around the
world, has data located in many other countries. Microsoft can easily
move data on one country's server to another without much burden or
cost to the company. To limit the enforcement of an SCA warrant to only
data located on servers within the United States would obstruct
government and criminal investigations. This limitation makes little
sense in a world where large amounts of data is constantly moving across
47.
48.
49.

Id.
Id. at 213.
Id. at 217.

50.

Id.

51.
52.

Id. at 216.
Id. at 220.
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borders at high speeds with little cost. The court, rather than looking at
where the data servers are located, should have given more weight to
where the ISP was located and the extent of the ISPs business in the
involved countries when determining if the SCA warrant could be
enforced.
This case also exemplifies how the SCA's language and goals have
been outdated and outpaced by technology. The SCA lacks many of the
considerations and concerns that have developed since its enactment. The
court, rather than choosing to acknowledge these advancements, chose to
adopt a limited and archaic view of the SCA that prevents the court from
fully addressing the issues in this case.

V. CONCLUSION

The decision in Microsoft Corp. v. United States challenged the scope
of the SCA. The Second Circuit, not taking into account the numerous
technological advancements since the SCA was passed, incorrectly
limited the enforcement of SCA warrants to only data that exists
domestically. This decision could have many undesirable consequences,
including criminals avoiding government SCA warrants. These issues
will continue to exist and pose problems for courts as technology rapidly
evolves.

